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INTRODUCTION
The interaction of air and ground warfare is as old as military aviation itself. As far back as WWI, air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS) have been integral missions supporting overall campaign objectives. Originally conceived as a mission to support military ground operations, the purpose of aerial interdiction has gradually changed and widened over time. In
World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, interdiction campaigns attempted to disrupt and destroy enemy goods and supply routes to such levels that any attempt by the enemy to conduct offensive operations would prove futile. In the Balkan theater, commanders used interdiction campaigns to coerce Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
The above examples represent both the traditional use of ground attack as well as the more recent focus of coercing an opponent with air power. These historical examples also show how operational planners have adjusted AI campaigns to met campaign objectives. Planners had to develop AI tactics that overcame issues that normally plague AI campaigns. Issues of denying sanctuary to an enemy, ensuring accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) using solely air power, and safely integrating ground forces with in the aerial interdiction construct are just a few of the many concerns that commanders historically face when conducting AI operations. Like in the past, in today's combat environment, planners are facing new operational interdiction challenges.
Complicating the air-to-ground warfare construct is its changing nature. The non-linear battlefields of Afghanistan, the speed of finding and fixing targets as well as the speed of ground offensives in the Iraqi theaters present unique problems for commanders seeking to use air power against ground targets effectively. To mitigate these issues, commanders have implemented a kill box command and control construct to integrate air power with ground scheme of maneuver.
While this fire support coordination measure (FSCM) solved some geographic airspace issues, when used in conjunction with a fire support coordination line (FSCL), the lines of AI and CAS are blurred.
There are several issues with the kill box/FSCL relationship. Kill boxes tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) allow air power to have freedom of action in a certain area of the battlespace. Depending where the kill box falls, however, the kill box may exude both procedural characteristics of AI and CAS. For example, if the kill box falls on the friendly side of the FSCL, TTPs recommend procedures similar to those prescribed in Joint Publication 3-09. 3 for Type 3 control CAS. If a kill box falls on the enemy side of the FSCL, TTPs recommend procedures similar to traditional AI. While, on the surface, these issues may seem frivolous, because the speed of the ground scheme of maneuver and time ground commanders need to update FSCL placement, ground commanders may need to place FSCLs long of the forward line of troops (FLOT) to reduce the potential for fratricide. Because of the operational detailed integration procedures needed to conduct air strikes inside the FSCL (kill box or CAS), combatant commanders cannot engage the enemy quickly and the enemy has sanctuary between the FLOT and the FSCL. Ultimately, to exploit the full potential of the kill box construct, especially in the non-linear battlespace, the joint community needs to develop a kill box "like" construct that not only replaces the FSCL but expands to become the primary means to define battlespace ownership, target engagement areas and most importantly, the supported and supported relationships within the battlespace. This paper will examine the evolving nature of air interdiction campaigns and offer some suggestions to transform the kill box construct in order to keep air-to-ground operations relevant in the changing battlefield environment. First, this paper will look at interdiction campaigns in every major aerial campaign since World War II and analyze the effectiveness of those campaigns. Next, this paper will examine current kill box TTPs defined by the joint community and highlight some short falls in those TTPs. Finally, using these discussions, this paper will outline ways the joint community can transform kill box TTPs that are more relevant and that take advantage of the technological, tactical, operational advantages that US forces have in today's battlespace.
HISTORICAL AI SHORTFALLS: SANCTUARY TO AN ENEMY OPERATION STRANGLE: ITALY -SPRING 1944
One of the first examples of a dedicated air interdiction campaign in World War II occurred in the Italy during the spring of 1944 called Operation STRANGLE. Operation STRANGLE was "designed to force the withdrawal of the German armies from central Italy by denying them essential supplies." 1 In the words of a Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) directive, the objective of the campaign was "to reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to a level which will make it impracticable for him to maintain and operate his forces in Central Italy." 2 The overall purpose of the operation was to destroy German supplies to such a degree to "strangle" the German Army and make a major Allied ground offensive unnecessary.
To achieve this goal, the MAAF first conducted operations against the Italian rail network system attacking "marshalling yard, bridges, tunnels, defiles and even stretches of tracks." 3 ( Fig.   1 ) Interdiction strikes conducted against viaducts and road bridges brought about the best effects in during the campaign, because, given the mountainous terrain in central Italy, German engineers were unable to repair the river and gorge crossings quickly. 4 This reduced German resupply efforts over time. However, these effects did not lead to success.
Figure 1. Interdiction Zone of Operation Strangle
Ultimately, Operation STRANGLE did not meet its objective to of making a major allied ground offensive unnecessary. During the allied ground offensive to capture Rome, the Allies suffered 42,000 casualties proving that the German army was a viable force and could still inflict heavy damage to Allied ground units. 5 There are several reasons for the shortfalls of Operation STRANGLE. The first is that the interdiction campaign was solely an air campaign.
STRANGLE did create supply shortages of various kinds and reduced German ammunition stocks, however, these shortages were not critical until the ground offensive began. 6 Had the allies combined the interdiction campaign with a ground offensive, German soldiers would have had to consume more supplies to hold ground in Italy. Other factors that inhibited the success of the operation were a lack of adequate night bomber capability and bad weather. The inability for the MAAF to attack German supply lines during the night and in bad weather allowed German forces to receive enough supplies to sustain defense operations in Italy. To accomplish these tasks, the FEAF targeting committee apportioned North Korea into 11 zones (A-K) and identified 172 targets within these zones to destroy. 8 ( Fig. 2 ) B-29's from the FEAF's Bomber Command sequentially attack zones A-C which corresponded to targets in the Northwestern portion of Korea. As interdiction operation continued, the number of B-29's in theater was reduced to from 5 to 3 groups, limiting FEAF's ability to attack all portions of North Korea's rail system. To reinforce interdiction operations, the US Navy attack began engaging targets in the easternmost zones.
Initially, the interdiction campaign saw some successes. In fact, the most successful period for Operation STRANGLE was the first three months of the campaign when the 8 th Army was conducting ground operations. 9 During these combined attacks, North Korean forces began to show some wear from the attacks. There were even reports of food shortages in some areas.
However, when these combined operations ceased so did the effectiveness of the interdiction effort.
Unfortunately, like the MAAF's Operation STRANGLE, the Korean Operation STRANGLE did not achieve its objectives. First, the FEAF had difficulty cutting enough rail lines to stop the slow the flow of goods to North Korean forces. According to Air Force Historian Robert Futrell, only 12.9% of the ordinance dropped had any effect on the rail system. 10 Furthermore, the FEAF strikes only decreased enemy rail transportation by 4 or 5% of its prewar levels.
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Figure 2. Interdiction Zones in North Korea
In addition, Allied planners underestimated the North Korea's reactions to the interdiction campaign. The FEAF's initial interdiction plan was to attack the interdiction zones sequentially rather than putting constant pressure across all zones. The North Koreans adjusted their supply routes to the east while the western routes were under attack. Moreover, the North Koreans began to move supplies at night and began to cannibalize double-track rail lines that assured at least a single track remained opened which, caused more problems for the FEAF.
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Not attacking across all zones at once or being able effectively engage forces at night gave North The effectiveness of Commando Hunt VII is difficult to assess. Seventh Air forces hailed the operation a success claiming it destroyed or damaged over 10,000 enemy trucks. 17 However, each aircraft assessed battle damage assessment (BDA) differently. For example, AC-130 and AC-119 crews assessed a truck destroyed if it exploded or suffered a sustained fire, while B-57
crews assessed a truck destroyed if it was no longer visible after a direct hit from a bomb, observed to burn, reduced to wreckage or, "rendered unusable or irreparable after a strike." and the between close air support (CAS) and AI. 22 The ALB and FOFA concept would change that philosophy. According to Lt Col Donald Roberts, author of "An Alternative Look at Air
Interdiction," the difference between BAI and CAS was how it affects the ground commander. 23 In other words, CAS influences the ground battle right now where AI influences the future battle.
CAS affects battalions and brigades where BAI affects divisions and corps. 24 Some pundits feel that this concept to interdiction was ahead of its time. In spite of this assessment, this BAI/CAS/FSCL relationship would cause some issues during Desert Storm.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AI AND THE LONG FSCL DESERT STORM: IRAQ -JAN 1991
The concept of operations for Desert Storm was different for both the USAF and the Army. 25 As expected, US forces planned normal interdiction (both air and battlefield) and CAS Guard sanctuary in Kuwait and gave them opportunity for some to them to escape through Basra.
This paper does not imply that US and collation air and ground forces were unable to engage and destroy a good portion of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Historical facts prove quite the opposite.
What this situation does highlight is the criticality of FSCL placement and its effects on the battlespace.
AI IN COERISIVE OPERATIONS OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: KOSOVO -MARCH 1999 -JUNE 1999
Unlike Desert Storm where air and ground forces worked together to achieve national objectives, during Operation Allied Force (OAF), US and NATO forces attempted to conduct an air only coercion campaign to end Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Given the quick success the CAS/AI campaign of Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, NATO planners felt that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic would capitulate after a few days of air strikes. 33 After finding these strikes ineffective, NATO leaders decided to shift from strictly attacking integrated air defense and command and control targets to conducting AI operations to destroy Serb forces in Kosovo and Serbia.
These AI missions ran into a myriad of problems. First, NATO pilots had to overcome a series of rules of engagement (ROE) hurdles that hampered finding, fixing and identifying targets. NATO pilots had to stay above 15,000 feet to stay out of reach of Serbian air defense artillery as well as most man portable (MANPAD) surface to air missiles. 34 While OAF commanders reduced this restriction when a FAC(A) was on station (NATO commander allowed pilots to descend to 5,000 feet above ground level), it was not enough to give pilots the ability to detect targets hiding in small villages, tree lines and the rolling hills of Kosovo. Second, intelligence updates were lacking. Pilots would launch with up to 30 potential target areas in hopes of finding targets, however, these photos and the intelligence associated with them were sometimes 12-24 hours old. 35 By the time pilot arrived at the target area, the target had moved.
Lastly, NATO pilots had to ask NATO leadership for permission to drop if they found any potential targets. For example, one US FAC(A) said he saw individuals setting fires in Kosovo villages, but when he asked to investigate, he was told to leave the area. 36 To overcome these shortfalls, NATO Forces clearly needed a ground option.
Once the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) entered the fight with a 4,000 guerrilla offensive in late May 1999, the landscape of the war changed. While the Serbian Army was able to destroy the KLA forces, they had to come out from hiding to do so. 
THE EFFECTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ON AI OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: AFGANISTAN -OCTOBER 2001 -PRESENT
Following OAF, the next substantial air interdiction operation occurred in Afghanistan.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) saw air power used almost exclusively in concert with Special Forces scheme of maneuver. Starting in mid October 2001, the US inserted Special Forces (SOF) and Tactics (STS) teams in Northern Afghanistan to support the North Alliance and other forces against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 38 The purpose of these teams was "to call in air attacks on Taliban forces in contact with opposition forces." 39 Initially, planners felt that these strikes would be insufficient so US Central Command planned to insert 50,000 additional ground forces if the air strikes needed support. 40 However, the US did not need the extra forces.
SOF/STS teams called in air strikes so efficiently that the Northern Alliance was able to capture
Mazer-e Sharif by 10 November and Kabul two days later. By 7 December, once Kandahar fell, the Taliban crumbled so North Alliance forces shifted their focus on rooting out rouge Al Qaeda and Taliban forces left fighting in other parts of Afghanistan.
As effective as these air strikes were (most sorties were flown in CAS and AI roles), there were still some problems in the execution process, specifically with time sensitive targeting (TST). One problem was general lack of understanding of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) employment and its effect on the ability to prosecute targets quickly. During OEF, there was a general consensus that a JDAM required "mensurated" latitude and longitude coordinates before an aircraft could employ the weapon. 41 Moreover, CENTCOM also required a collateral damage estimate for on all targets before aircraft could employ ordinance and process could take up to two hours. 42 If operational commanders hope to achieve success in dynamic targeting missions especially against fleeing targets, obviously, the process must be faster than two hours.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AI AND THE LONG FSCL (TAKE TWO) OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: IRAQ -MARCH 2003 -PRESENT
While US and collation forces fought in OEF, combat operations began in Iraq. Like the first Gulf War, the air campaign during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) had many of the same elements; strategic strikes on downtown Baghdad, kill box operations, and a relatively fast moving ground offensive. What was different was how collation forces executed combat operations. Instead of an air war to prepare and shape the battlespace for a ground offensive, US and collation ground forces first started a massive ground offensive pushing from Kuwait. With
Army V Corps units in the west, USMC I MEF in the east and British forces securing Basra and points southeast, collation forces were extremely effective. Ground forces were able to move on average 75 miles per day to and secure Baghdad in three weeks. The air war was also different.
OIF commanders used air power almost solely in kill box interdiction and CAS mission, which made up almost 80% of OIF missions flown in these operations. 43 As previously stated, from a campaign perspective, OIF was a tremendous success, however, some of the same FSCL issues that occurred in Desert Storm resurfaced in OIF. In the case of OIF, at times, V Corps placed the FSCL 140km or 84 miles from the forward line of troops (FLOT). 44 Short of this line, all kill boxes were closed and were difficult to open for attacks because of some shortfalls at the ASOC's equipment. 45 Unhappy with the 140km FSCL, the 1 st MEF implemented a new concept call a battlefield coordination line (BCL) that served the same functions as the FSCL however, was much closer to the FLOT. This BCL gave more freedom of action to aircraft interdicting in kill boxes beyond the BCL, however, it also caused problems. 46 According to one USMC reconnaissance battalion commander, he was unable to use certain terrain for his ground scheme of maneuver because of an overlapping kill box. 47 While this may have been an isolated problem, it does highlight potential coordination issues and management of kill boxes. The kill box construct used in OIF allowed for a tremendous freedom of action for the air units inside the kill box but based on this example, this freedom has the potential to restrict ground units from maneuver. The joint community needed to refine kill box TTPs further.
TRANSFORMING AI: PART II -ESTABLISHING KILL BOX TTPS
Even though military campaigns have used kill boxes since Vietnam, the joint community had not formalized any TTPs until June 2005 with Air Land Sea Application release of the "Multiservice Manual for Kill Box Employment". The manual attempts to update procedures for kill boxes operations using the construct as kill boxes as FSCMs. 48 It specifically states that kill boxes are NOT a reference system although they are usually associated with an area reference system (i.e. a Common Grid Reference System or Global Area Reference System (GARS)). 49 Kill boxes can be open or closed and when opened, fall in to two categories; blue and purple. Blue kill boxes allow air to surface fires without coordination or deconfliction.
Purple kill boxes allow for both air-to-surface fires as well as indirect surface-to-surface fires.
Fires in purple kill boxes are deconflicted by time or space, laterally or vertically. Essentially, according to this publication, kill boxes are similar to existing FSCM like free fire areas (blue kill boxes), no fire areas (closed kill boxes), and airspace coordination areas (purple kill boxes). 
TRANSFORMING AI: PART III -MOVING BEYOND KILL BOXES FROM A FSCM TO A JOINT FIRES AREA
From previous historical examples, kill box TTPs have improved drastically over time.
Even with this improvement, there are some shortfalls in current TTPs for kill boxes operations.
With current technological advances, the ability for surveillance sources to find and fix targets, and a shift from a linear battlespace concept to a non-linear battlespace, the joint community must move toward battlespace command and control measures that not just deconflict air and ground combat operations but integrate them as well. In order for kill box interdiction operations to achieve greater effects, the joint community must update current TTPs to allow a more robust and reactive construct that does the following: a) Doesn't provide sanctuary in any area of the battlespace b) Is reactive to quickly exploit missions with minimal command and control friction c) Quickly integrates air and ground forces and fires safely and efficiently d) Ensures that all aircrew and ground maneuver units perform in a joint manner
To take advantage of the kill box framework, joint TTPs should expand the concept of kill boxes beyond the FSCM paradigm to more of a joint reference system for combined operations. Using the term put forth by the Joint Fires Coordination Measures group at Nellis AFB, NV, the joint community should call them Joint Fires Areas. 53 Using the GARS reference system, the JFC would overlay joint fire areas that his or her component commanders could use to integrate and synergize joint forces. These areas would define supported and supporting relationships within these joint fires areas. Furthermore, using GARS, all forces, both air and ground, can use the same reference format to define joint fires areas and move closer to building a common operating picture.
Armed with this joint fires concept, the next step in enhancing these procedures is to remove the concept of the FSCL and replace it with the joint fires area concept throughout the battlespace. When setting a FSCL, the ground commander considers a variety of factors. One of these is scheme of maneuver. If the ground commander anticipates moving a great distance over a linear battlefield, he may set the FSCL far from the FLOT knowing that it takes some time to reset a FSCL (as long as 12 hours). As previously stated, in OIF, ground commanders set the Another issue with having a separate FSCL/BCL with a kill box system is that the two may not overlap. Typically, well-defined terrain features such as a river or a mountain range identify FSCLs and BCLs where joint fires areas are defined by the GARS construct which uses lines of latitude and longitude to define areas. 55 The problem with using the FSCL or BCL is that references used by ground forces may be difficult for aircrew to see. By using joint fires areas as a reference system, all players in the battlespace can talk using the same data.
Furthermore, most ground units have GPS that would allow them to identify where joint fires areas end or begin. Even if GPS systems fail, ground commanders, referring to established joint fires areas drawn on maps, can still operate under the reference system.
By using the joint fires area construct instead of FSCLs or other FSCM as the reference system for the entire battlespace, when ground commanders communicate with aircrew they will speak the same language. For example, under the current structure, if an aircrew is looking for the forward line of friendly troops for ground unit X, he or she may hear this: "Ground Unit X is or what function occur in a particular joint fires area. This command and control structure merely acts as overseer for the owner of a particular joint fire area and on behalf of the JFC directs, integrates and deconflicts assets as necessary to achieve JFC goals.
Using current doctrine as a framework, perhaps the best command and control structure to perform this duty exists at the joint air operations center (JAOC). According to Joint Publication 3-30, one of the JFACC's taskings to oversee the command and control of airspace to enhance the effectiveness of accomplishing the JFC's objectives. 56 This includes both positive and procedural control methods to insure air and ground assets are deconflicted. To accomplish this tasking, the JFACC has a robust staff with liaisons from each service and other non-military players (i.e. non-governmental organizations) that give him or her data to execute the air mission. These liaisons, using the theater air ground system (TAGS) TTPs and other methods, disseminate data back and forth to the JFACC to deconflict services operating in the same AOR, deconflict air assets from fires occurring in the AOR, as well as fulfill requests for air power in support of the ground scheme of maneuver (i.e. CAS or AI).
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Another asset at the JFACC disposal is the Theater Battlefield Management Core System (TBMCS). According to the Joint Interoperability Test Command, "TBMCS provides the air commander with the means to plan, direct, and control all theater air operations in support of command objectives and to coordinate with ground and maritime elements engaged in the same operation." 58 According to a US Marine Corps concept brief, TBMCS will provide better interface with air and ground components during combat operations. 59 For example, ground commanders can input requests for CAS directly to the JAOC. In addition, there is also a near real time blue force tracking (BFT) capability and some capability for real time chat with users of the system as well as other enhancements of the current TAGS TTPs.
While these liaisons and TBMCS provide vital information, their role in the JAOC, except for CAS, is based on deconfliction, not integration. For example, the role of the Army's liaison element, the battlefield coordination detachment, is to provide the JFACC situational awareness on Army operations as they affect the air operations. However, under current TTPs, beyond CAS, the detachment does not integrate Army ground scheme of maneuver with air scheme of maneuver, nor does it have the situational awareness to do so. 60 Consequently, aircrew has very little situational awareness on the ground scheme of maneuver except the location of FSCMs like the FSCL or other planned ACA's. Moreover, ground maneuver elements have very little situational awareness on air assets except pre-planned CAS sorties. As for TBMCS, while it does have some BFT capability, not all ground units are on the BFT net so it cannot be a sole sort for friendly ground maneuver units.
To manage joint fires areas properly, the liaisons and TBMCS needs to be more robust to work with the JFACC in managing and allocating airspace for weapons employment. The last enhancement to joint fires area operations is the kill box coordinator concept outlined in kill box TTPs. Under kill box TTPs, a kill box coordinator is required when multiple flights are operating in the same kill box. 62 The coordinator manages the kill box to ensure that aircraft are deconflicted from each other as well as from any other fires occurring in that kill boxes. The coordinator also may be call upon to locate, identify, mark, make collateral damage assessments and provide terminal guidance for air to ground fires. Furthermore, this coordinator may need to provide BDA or BHA (as necessary) to the JAOC. While these tasks are very similar to those of a FAC(A), the TTPs are very specific that the two missions are not confused. Interdiction operations must evolve to meet the changing nature of the battlespace.
Because of the rapid pace of ground maneuver units, the ability for assets to find and fix targets, and the non-linear battlespace, the joint community must expand AI procedures. To remain effective, the kill box concept needs refinement. That refinement must include a shift in philosophy of what a kill box is, how it is controlled, and the supported and supporting relationships within those areas. Furthermore, to execute within joint fire areas, aircrew must conduct frequent joint training. Air Warrior I and II are excellent training arenas; however, they do not occur often enough for aircrew to gain proficiency in the joint maneuver battlespace. If the joint community moves to the joint fires area concept of managing the battlespace, the JFC will gain more flexibility and versatility to use his or her forces as needed to met national objectives.
